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Globalization is a dynamic, transboundary force challenging the
lTestphalian model of state-dominated geopolitics that has dominated
world affars for neady 400 years. Equaliy problematic to state-cenrric
international relations is global climate change, an environmental calamrty
that is increasingly being recogntzed as a threat to state security, yet cannot
be solved by traditional diplomatic or military meafls. Consequently, an arcay
of sub-national actors are beco*irg more influential in all areas of global
governance, including the mariagement of the planet's ecological commons.
This paper explores how cities are following the trajectory of this trend to
establish themselves as wodd leaders in formulating climate change agendas.
Inconsistent efforts to draft effective climate stfategies at the state and
international levels are contributing to this power shift, along with the abiliry
of metro-regions to establish global networks dedicated to sound emissions
reduction and climate planning strategies. Analysis further shows that urban
areas are important loci of economic production and commodities output, as
well as key entry points for domestic and international rrade, the combination
of which suggests metro-regions have the necessary capital and political
wherewithal to serve as initiators of green diplomacy. Discussion follows
concerning the specific intra-state and transnational efforts cities are taking
to become catalysts for international climate action, as well as what unique
challenges they face.
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Traditionally, political discourse has been born out of competing
paradigms attempting to define how things are, how things should be,
and how things can be changed to satisfy an ever shifting aray of human
needs and desires. The cessation of wars has been the result of this
process, as have some of history's greatest civil nghts movements. tWhile
territorial conflicts and social equity matters remain important aims for
a1l governing bodies, political actors have increasingly been challenged to
integrate the needs of the built environment into the biophysical realm, as
demonstrated by ongoing debates concerning how greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions should be tegulated. The dominance of GHGs in current
political arenas is related, of course, to their contribution to climate
change, a severe environmental crisis that if left unabated has the potential
of making "the twenty-fifst centufy . . . the age of global catastrophe"
(Matthew, 201,0, p. 3aZ).
At first glance, it would seem a multi-national approach toward
curtailing GHGs would be an appropriate and sensible strategy,
especially since the atmosphete is a ubiquitous resource shared by all
peoples. Such ^n approach fits neatly 
into the Westphalian model of
state-dominated governance that has held sway for nearly four centuries
(Segbers, 2011). Despite these considerations, it is actually cities that are
quickly becoming the most important players in global environmental
governance. Their ascendancy into this role is somewhat paradoxical
given they have traditionally been embedded within the larger body politic
of their parent nation, a configuration that would seem to reinforce the
idea that international governance is the exclusive domain of the state.
However, extensive nerworks of cities active in formulating climate
change agendas are challenging states for primacy in green international
relations. To understand how this shift in influence has taken shape, this
paper will create a historical backdrop illustrative of how globaltzation and
environmental threats are creattng the political spaces necessary for cities
to become wodd leaders in negotiating climate planning. An examination
will follow as to why cities are the most likely sub-national actors to
fulfill this role, along with a review of the specific steps they are taking as
catalysts for international climate action in a global commons no longer
dominated by the state.
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International relations have long been dominated by a state-centric
form of geopolitics known as the Westphalian System. This system
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is predicated on the idea that each nation-state is a sovereign territory
equal in legal stature as its neighbors, and free to govern its domestic
structures independent of outside intervention (Falk, 2002). Historically,
this political construct is acknowledged as having its origins in the
1648 Peace of lTestphaba, a series of trearies born out of the ashes of
Europe's Thtrty Years'\War @uggie, 1,993). As a consequence of these
proceedings, European dignitaries came to recogflize a more cleady
legitimized notion of sovereignty where the state supplanted previous
medieval organtzational forms as having the greatest authority within
its territorial boundaries. Iniually, this sovereignty-based, state-centric
approach to governance was viewed as a necessary step if Europe was to
eschew decades of wat in favor of a more balanced network of pou/er
(Croxton, 1999). Johan Adler Salvius, a Swedish baron presenr during the
1,648 treaties, cogently described the idea of European power symmetry by
noting "The first rule of politics is that the securify of all depends on the
equiJibrium of the individuals. When one begins to become powerful . . .
the others place themselves, through unions or alliances, into the opposite
balance in order to maintain the equipoise" (qtd. in Croxton, 1 999, p.
590). Westphalian ideas of sovereignty became further entrenched by the
1713 Treaty of Utrecht which saw its participants crysr alhze statist theory
through their acknowledgment that"a defense of [power] equilibrium
should be the core concern of all" @uggie, 1993).
Ultimately, Westphalian geopolirics evolved beyond the European
milieu to shape global relations everywhere, principally as a consequence
of Imperial conquest and colontzation, but also as a necessary repercussive
of post-\Wodd tWar I and II statesmen who viewed the \Westphalian
model as being the geopolitical archetype most suitable for keeping world
relations intact (Falk, 2002). Accordingly, Westphalian sovereignry is
often viewed as the progenitor of modern political realism where state
capacity and survival arc seerr as priorities for wodd leaders who must
seek to enhance their own national interests while keeping the aggressive
tendencies of other self-interested states atbay through alliances and the
development of poterit economic and military factors"(R.uggie, 1gg3.).
While it is debatable whether or riot Westphalian thinking has lessened
or worsened the wodd's reoccurring spates of political turbulence, it is
generally agreed that statism is and has been the dominant means by
which the international community maps its diplomatic orientation. Yet
despite its significance in shaping wodd affats, there is a growing sense the
Westphalian model is being reconfigured by two of the 21st cenrury's most
trans formative agents : globahzation and environmental crisis.
As a complex, worldwide process for economic integration and
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societal interchange, globalizatton has enabled the fluid translocation of
people, finance, ideologies, and commodities. Appadurar (2008) believes
this woddwide ebb and flow of diverse forces is a consequence of
transportation and communication-based technologies that have allowed
human interests to transcend physical and national boundaries alike.
Consider that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the wodd is now
completely encircled by a capitahst system "tooled by new information
and communication technologies that zre at the roots of new productiviry
sources, of new orgarizational forms, and of the formation of a global
economy" (Castel1s, 1999, p.2). Ohmae (2008) adds technological
change is a dynamic force undermining the authority of states in what is
increasingly becoming a cross-border civi-lization, one where far-reachtng
market actors will re-shape the world into a collection of economic zones
unrethered to nationalist designs. Segbers (2011) argues thatat the very
least globaltzation has created a ne'w sftattfication of governance where
global institutions, states, and sub-national players are now intertwined
amongst one another in a new politics of scale which is as complex
vertically as it is horizontally.
The rapid pace by which these economic, social, and geopolitical
changes are occurring has created a melting-pot scenario for nation-
states where their markets, finances, and cultural norms are becoming
bit pieces in a newly emerging political economy that does not recogntze
long hetd ideas of state sovereignty. Ar a result, globaltzation is eroding
the Wesrphalian model's long-lived, atomistic makeup of the wodd,
replacing it with a mosaic of state and non-state actors who are finding an
increasing number of footholds in an ever shifting geopolitical landscape
@ierwechter, 201,3). Lemos and Agrawal (2006) argue globahzation has
completely re-organtzed the nation-state as a governing apparatus, creating
a rescaled political space that transfers power upward to supranational
agencies such as the United Nations even as it diffuses power downward
to region al and local players. And while it is unlikely globalization will
completely erase state borders anytime soon, it is clear a post-\ilTestphalian
schema is emerging where traditionalplayers such as nation-states are no
longer the sole arbiters of governance and policy-making, even as today's
relentless diaspora of people, money, goods, and ideas is opening new
political spaces for non-state actors such as cities.
Unlike globahzation, environmental threats have taken longer to
alter the landscape of internalonalrelations despite the fact they have
plagued human societies for most of recorded history. Diamond (2005)
assefts a fatlure to adequately address deforestation and soil erosion
led to the collapse of the ancientMaya. Similar issues haunted the
i "'L *2 *1 (, i ,",1 /1 ) f Lr, ' s4/2 -i.1 .t-,. \J ', i
fu, * ,, za tr ?. vi m ,a, lo n, ,",4Z ',*; 81 '.."2 1 fu q q* V Z W Wf
Anasazt of southwest North America who completely razed the region's
hardwood groves, mismanaged an over-extended irngation system, and,
as a consequence,'were forced to abandon lands they had occupied for
neady five hundred years (Ibid.). On the surface it r,vould seem as if these
rypes of large-scale environmental calamities would decrease over time
as advancements in scientific theory and technology have combined to
provide a breathtaking array of knowledge and tools. However, this does
not seem to be the case given environmental crises now stalk unabated
acfoss all seven continents. From undrinkable water to roiling clouds
of noxious fumes, modern communities appear every bit as inept at
managing their natural environs as their ill-fated arrcestors. Dierwechter
(2013) reports that until the end of the 19th century, past and modern
societies shared another commonaltq these issues were never ^ matter oftransnational interest. This would change with industriahzatton, however,
as factory caused effluence and ar pollution began modifying the planet's
waters and atmosphere at unprecedented fates. Soon, one pefson's toxic
waste became everyone's as streams, oceans, and winds circulated pollution
around the globe on an epic scale. States were quickly placed in the
uncomfortable position of not only having to be accountable for their
own industrial habits, but to also watchdog those of their neighbors.
The ability of pollution to seep across geographic boundaries has led
to a broad shift from the intetnational community's usual preoccupation
with state-to-s tate aggression; instead, territorially fixed governments must
now contend with non-traditional security threats rooted in environmental
crisis (Nzlathews,1997). Episodes like Chernobyl and the 2011Fukushima
nuclear reactor breach have certainly cemented this reabq for territorialll,
fixed states who find themselves caught in the path of radiation
contaminated au and water. I(arkkainen (2004) likens such transboundary
calamities as harbingers of apost-\ilTestphalian system of internattonal
governance, clanfytng that'Although states remain . . . i*portant actors
in the global arena and within theit ow{r territorial jurisdictions, sovereign
states themselves have come to recogntze that some environmental
problems lie beyond the limits of ordinary state competence, too complex
to be resolved through straightforward exercises of state sovereignty" (p.
74). Nowhere is this potential for geopolitical re-orientation more evident
than in the penultimate environmental crisis of our time: global climate
change.
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existing seaboards, and intensify inclement weather patterns woddwide,
global climate change has been acknowledged by the international
scientific community as the most pressing concern human societies face
today (IPCC, 201,3). When considering global climate change's impacts
on natural systems, it is prudent to remember humankind's fate is direcdy
tethered to ecological outcomes. Recognition of this has forced political
leaders to come to grips with the fact that climate change is every btt a
danger to human infrastructures and well-being as it is to ecosystems.
Matthew (2010) uses a potent cause-effect linkage to summartze these
threats:
Expanded ranges for disease vsctors,
intensihed heat waves, and decreased
livability due to a combination of
environmental stressors
Mass migration of humans as a
consequence of flooding, &ougltt,
and severe weather
Large*scale, reactionary efforts to
address these issues via engineering,
military intervention, and massive
inputs of labor
Untenable strains placed on health care
systems, and increased mortality rates in
regions unable to adequately prepare or
adapt
Violent conflicts over the possession o{
and access to, water, food, energy, and
other finite resources
Economic hardship on a global scale due
to widespread market collapse and re-





A11 told these scenarios pose innumerable risks that might further
destabilize areas akeady under duress from weak economies, political
unrest, miJitary strife, and poody managed infrastructures (Ibid.). These
realities are salient, for they remind us the \X/estphalian system of state
sovereignty was created to safeguatd agatnst state-to-state aggression,
and offers no benefit to nations facing a shapeless, amorphous threat of
complex etiology such as global climate change.
Evaluation models for how climate change might affect human
societies have traditionally been focused on nation-states, with a stzable
number of these being directed toward agricultural and ecosystem impacts
(Rosenzweig, 2010). This trend has changed in recent years, however,
as scientists, politicians, and planflers are now viewing the effects of
climate change through an Lncreasingly urban lens, a repriorittzatton that
is unsurprising given neady half of the wodd's population currently
lives in cities with this amount expected to reach B0o/o by 2050 (T"ly,
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2011). From a planning and mitigation standpoint, this shift in human
d.istribution cannot be understated, for it speaks to a newly emerging
global c^rtography that places cities at the foreground of envjronmental
issues. Accordingly, a multi-disciplined methodology has taken root where
social, health, and biophysical scientists are working collaboratively to
study the impacts climate change will have on the urban environment.
This holistic approach toward assessing potential risks caprures the
interdependent nature of human health, ecosystems, and socioeconomic
vitality, and reflects a new urgency in determining how cities are likely
to fare in the wake of global climate change. It also reflects the broader
contours by which climate change is now being evaluated, namely in
research and scholarship that is increasingly beco^irg weighted roward
urban considerations (R.osenzweig, 201 0).
A review of empirical evide nce affrrms that urban populations will
bear the brunt of climate change impacts in the coming years (Corfee-
Morlot et aI.,2009). Perhaps the most widely discussed example involves
the risks presented by rising sea levels which threaten densely settled
lowlands and estuarine watersheds both of which are susceptible to severe
flooding (IPCC, 2013). McGranahan et al. (2007) report inhabitants
of low elevation coastal zones will be particulady affected by climate
change given neady two-thirds of all cities with greater than fve million
residents occupy such areas. This translates into approximately 1.0o/o
of the wodd's population living in harm's way of intractable flooding,
putting them at risk for settlement displacement, economic decline, and
high mortality rates. Perhaps equally alarming are rhe health implications
of poor ambient air quality, as revealed in a study conducted by Bell
et al. (2007). Various emissions projections related to climate change
suggest urban populations will be particularly hard hit due to increases in
tropospheric ozone levels during summer months, the net affect being a
rise in associated adverse health conditions such as asthma, compromised
lung function, and increased death rates amoflg infants and the elderly. In
addition, temperature projections for 2050 show a strong likelihood of
extended periods of warmth such that mortahry rates in U.S. metropolitan
regions will see a700/o increase in heat stroke and heat exhaustion related
deaths (I(alkstein & Greene,2007). These studies speak to rhe urban
real-ities of climate change, and underscore the consequences of the latter
will be concentrated disproportionately among metropolitan regions and
the people living there.
In recognizing the myriad threats posed by climate change, many
political discussions at the national and sub-national level have arisen to
define what the most effective strategie s ^r:for reducing GHG emissions.
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While currently prevalent across all strata of academic and political
life, these talks were initially conducted by state dignitaries operating at
global forums, since it was assumed that climate change was alarge scale
problem necessitating collaborative, international action. In fact, over
the past thirry years numerous multi-national forums have been held to
addiess climate change, including such signature events as the 1,979 Wodd
Climate Conference, the 19BB Toronto Conference, and the 1995 United
Nations Climate Change Conference (Gupta, 201.0). Additionally, many
other globa\-tiered scientific and political gatherings sirnilar to the 1.987
Brundtland Commission have embedded climate change within the context
of broader sustainability goals fWodd, 1987). While these meetings
are emblematic of today's post-WN(III internationalism where multiple
states often work together on complex, trans-boundary issues, they were
unprecedented for their time in that they reflected the emergence of the
global climate onto the wodd political stage (Dierwechtet, 201,3).
Initially, multi-national efforts to curtail GHG emissions seemed quite
promising. For example, Gupta (2010) reports the 1979 Wodd Climate
Conference led to a number of critically important research programs,
including the Intergovefnmental Panel for Climate Change which
serves as a clearinghouse to review, decipher and disseminate "the most
recent scientifi c, technical, and socio-economic information produced
woddwide relevant to the understanding of climate change" (IPCC,
201,3). Another fruitful multi-state effort concerning the atmosphere was
the 1987 Montreal Protocol which successfully frnaltzed an international
treaty to protect the ozone layer from harmful chlorofluorocarbons
(Clapp & Dauvergne, 2011). AII told, these events heralded a new age of
political governance where the metde of states to resolve complex, trans-
toundary environmental problems is being continuously tested. They
also signaled an acknowledgement that humankind's relationship with
the atmosphere is irrevocably changing, namely in that the latter is now
a newly defined political space whose chemical make-up is as dependent
on anthropogenic processes as it is biophysical ories. Indeed, since 1,979
the atmosphere has become more than a thin veil of life-supporting gases
- it has become the premiere political space for multiple actors trying to
articulate an appropriate framework of action for one of the planet's worst
environmental problems.
\)7hile the 1987 Montreal Protocol stands as a model for multi-state
environmental governance, international attempts to address climate
change have been mostly mired in ineffectiveness since the STCC first
met to discuss the issue ln1,979. The reasons for this are varied, yet
certain trends stand out as being especially problematic. First, many of
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the early GHG targets set by internatiorral accords were non-binding and
often worded ambiguously. Second, the frnancial assistance promised to
the global South to provide technological and developmental upgrades
necessary for limittng emissions was frequendy abandoned due to the
ecoflomic shortfallings of the donors. Thlrd, the economic collapse
of middle-tiered nations such as Russia in 1997 meant that concurrent
drops in GHG emissions by these countries demotivated them from
being participants. Lastly, many periphery nations have been reluctant to
embrace climate treaties for fear these agreemerits can be used to restrict
their development (Gupta,2010). Perhaps the worst stumbling block
arose from the United States' refusal to become a signatory of the 1,997
Ifoto Protocol. Born out of President George Bush's reluctance to push
for a modification in American lifestyles, and matched by an equally bullish
resistance from the industrial sector, the United States passed the Ryrd-
Hagel Resolution in 1997 which prohibited the U. S. from accepting ". .
.^ny future binding quantitative [emissions] targets until and unless key
developing countries also participated meaningfully . . ." (Ibid., p. 643).
Consequently, past and present efforts made by international accords to
address climate change have been unevefl at best.
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With state-led international efforts unable to curtail GHG emissions
in a substantive, uniform fashion, and globaltzatton challenging the
STestphalian state-cenffic geopolitical system, the terrains of global
goyernance and green diplomacy have changed dramatically over a handful
of decades. This has allowed multiple non-state and sub-national actors
to occupy the new political spaces that are emerging relative to climate
action. Certainly this is nothing nqw given coalitions of non-governmental
organTzations (I.{GOE dedicated to environmental issues have been active
and increasing in influence since climate change first gained international
attention during the latter part of the 20th century (Bouteligier,201,1).
In the United States alone, sub-nationalactors have become increasingly
relevant as exemplified by a 2007 coalition of American states that sued
the Bush administration for its inability to appropriately regulate GHG
emissions under the Clean Air Act (Selin & Van I)ever, 2010). The most
active sub-national fotces for climate management and planning, however,
appear to be cities given more and more urban areas are "reworking
traditionalhierarchal models of global climate governance by creating
their o\^/n climate change programs" (Rice, 2013, p. 1). The development
of this trend is reflexively linked to a complex web of environmental
problems such as climate change that Toly (201,1) claims are increasingly
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becoming "conditioned by the idiosyncrasies of the production,
distribution, and consumption of u/ealth in cities. This relationship
occasions the vrbanlzation of global environmental governance" (p. 1,42).
Toly's assessment undergirds the idea cities are no longer constrained to
local environmental considerations, but are instead altering the types and
complexities of environmental issues faced by communities woddwide.
There are unique factors that make cities more effective than state
and international coalitions when it comes to global environmental
governance. To begin, ecological crises are usually dynamic and
reflect complex relationships that exist between the built and natural
environment. Karkkainen (2004) argues that for this reason state and
international entities are ill-equipped to provide solutions, since they tend
toward formulating rigid, highly prescriptive rules rather than flexible
strategies capable of mitigating fluid environmental problems. Further,
international pacts to reduce GHG emissions do not account for the
realities of multiple causation and location specific tendencies, nor do
they allow for flexible policymaking that can be easily adjusted outside of
the international arena; rather, they rely on "ofle size fits all" emissions
standards that attempt to shoebox climate action into a singular agreement
(Gupta, 2010). On one hand, this sort of lirnited, command-style
approach to problem solving is reflective of the \Testphalian geopolitical
model in that it assumes risk control ofl a transnational scale is best
mediated by state players. On the other hand, it accentuates the need for
a post-Westphalian style of governance that recognizes effective climate
action will not be solved by statist policies alone, but will instead be
resolved as a consequeflce of state and local actors working in concert.
Cities, in contrast to the international communiry they are a part of,
are more proximal to the contributors and causal agents of global climate
change, and are better suited to succeed where state coalitions have faiied.
As noted by Betsill and Bulkeley (2006), the issue of climate change is best
handled by municipal leaders that can attune policy and mitigation efforts
to the unique site-specific factors responsible for climate change:
GHG emissions originate from processes that are embedded in
specific places, and it is often argued that the local is the most
appropriate political jurisdiction fot bringing about any necessary
reductions in these emissions. Many [municipal] governments have
considerable authority over land use planning and waste management
and can play an important role in dealing with transportation issues
and energy consumption (p. 141).
I(arkkainen (2004) adds environmental problems require local,
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adaptive management strategies which use place-based approaches built
on "principles of continuous experimentation and dynamic adjustment in
response to . . . flew information, changing conditions, and the observed
effects of past management efforts" (p. 79). This governance structure
aligns well with urban leaders who can quickly and effectively tailor their
climate agendas to local particularities, a policymaking formula absent
from state and internationally directed plans. trinally, global treaties like the
Ifoto Protocol are not legally binding agreements, thus they are incapable
of exerting tangible influence on urban and market stakeholders capable
of making or breakitg climate change agendas. In contrast, cities and
municipal leaders can "facilitate direct action in response to climate change
by fostering partnerships with relevant stakeholders, encouraging public
participation, and lobbying national governments" @etsill & Bulkeley,
2006, p. M3).
Another reasori why ciries are ascendirg the ranks of global
environmental governance is they arc pra.cflcally unmatched as engines of
economic production, and can generate the capital necessary to influence
both national and transnational polities. Their ability to create wealth is
largely because they serve as hubs for industrial output and commodities
exchange, and contribute heavily to international trade streams. It is also
due to deep connections cities have to their surrounding geographies
which provide labor pools and sources of material inputs for the creadon
of goods (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009). Accordingly, Dierwechter (2013)
argues it is more accurate to describe cities and their neighboring
territories as 'city-regions' defined by a complex arcay of intedacing
economic, transportation, industrial, cultural, and sociopolitical systems.
The end result of this configuration is city-regions represent agglomerate
economies that not only comprise the bulk of their respective narion's
output and labor development, but are also key regimes in the global
ecorromy. This is evidenced by the fact that in many Organrzation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries - Norway,
Japan, and France as examples - a single metro-region is responsible for
producing one-third to one-half of its nation's GDP (Corfee-Morlot et
a1.,2009). This robust contribution to state and global economi.es, along
with ari expansive, uneven geography, rejects traditional assessments that
cities zre locally fixed, neatly demarcated zones, and pfesents them instead
as large, densely populated areas affected by and affecting alarger tier of
national and international processes. As such, cities have the economic,
social, and political wherewithal necessary to influence climate action orr a
global scale.
!7ith the economic and political influence necessary to become
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crucial players in emissions governance, cities have wasted no time in
asserting themselves. This is best demonstrated in the United States
where dissatisfaction with a tepid federal response to GHG mitigation
has spurred city leaders to take action. The methodologies urban spaces
are uttlizing to influence climate action are quite varied, yet Segbers (2011)
identifies networks of municipalities as the main channel by which the
urbansphere is engaging in global climate governance. According to
Dierwechter (2010), u prime example is the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection
Agreement (MCPA) which was drafted in 2005 by then Seattle mayof
Greg Nickels. This plan calls upon mayors from ail. fifty states to reduce
GHGs to 7o/o below 1990 levels as originalTy targeted by the I(yoto
Protocol. Elements of this plan include broad-based directives to reform
urban land-use, transit, energy) housing, and waste systems. There is also
a call. for municipalities to actively lobby state and federal governments to
adopt legislation supportive of and complementary to local climate action.
Approximately 1,000 cities are currendy participating in the MCPA,
making it the signature sub-national climate action movement in the
United States (Ibid.).
Along with domestic measures taken by U.S. urban leadets,
international networks of cities are also making significant contributions.
The C40 Ciries Climate Leadership Group is one such assemblage, and is
comprised of 58 major metropolitan regions that combined account for
1.Bo/o of the wodd's gross domestic product. This powerful coalition has
adopted a collaborative approach to addressing climate change as shown
by its involvement in 4,734 collective actions aimed at developitg state-
of-the-art technologies and urban planning projects that can be uti-lized
woddwide including:
. Low-carbon building designs reliant on renewable energy sources
rather than fossil fuels
' Enhanced public health infrastructures capable of serving
vulnerable communities affected by climate change. Zero waste strategies centered around recycling, composting, and
the use of waste by-products as inputs for industrial processes. Education and outreach programs counselng individuals and firms
on what specific steps they can take to lessen their emissions
footprint
Equally impressive to these activities is the C40 members' commitment
to sharing knowledge, assets, and technical expertise to non-member
cities and national governments (C40, 201,3). Much like the United States'
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roles city-regions are taking relative to implementing aggressive climate
planning. Moreover, the C40's emphasis on knowledge diffusion across
state boundaries highlights the ability of cities to influence international
regimes. These supra-national networks are not only indicative of how
emissions control measures and climate change initiatives are proliferating
at the municipal level, they also suggest the atmosphere is becbming
deeply embedded in all aspects of urban politics and planning.
Rice (2011) contends that if cities are to continue making significant
inroads in the realm of environmental governance, they must align public
sector strategies to the interests of private firms and individuals. This
means municipalities must actively t^rget businesses and citizens with
education based, market driven solutions. Allman et al. (2004) report this
has proven true in the United I(ngdom where local authorities having
the most success in addressing climate change are those who effectively
increase public awareness of the secondary benefits of reducing GHG
emis sions, including green employment opportunities, improved livability,
and independence from fossil fuels. In the Unites States, Seatde has
rolled out several marketing campaigns to inform its citizens as to the
health, economic, and environmental benefits of energy-eff,ciency
measures and alternative transportation (Rice, 201,1). In essence, cities
are creatively finding ways to initiate smart climate planning by using
economic motivators backed by scientific reasons. Politically these
mechanisms have a numbe r of benefits for local authoriti.r, fir.t, they
engage citizens and private enterprises in a non-compulsory fashion that
lowers resistaflce to climate Lntttatives; second, they expand knowledge
across all fronts relative to threats posed by atmospheric warming; finally,
they incentivize businesses to become willing participants by expounding
the financial gains of greener communities. Ultimately, the sum effect
is municipalities are able to move forward with neu/ and novel forms of
climate management.
Despite the growing role cities are playrng in global climate
governance, they are still vulnerable to the same political strife and
generahzed apathy that has often precluded states from making meaningful
progress toward reducing GHG emissions. This should come as no
surprise since the atmosphere as a political space is not immune to
politicized science, or competing market interests that resist constraints
to economic and industrialtzed development. In terms of the former,
a skeptical public has often emerged who is unwilling to support
environmentally driven initiatives viewed as too costly (Selin & Van Dever,
2010). In the case of the latter, a hostile business regime develops that
attempts to subvert government controls by lobbyrng against climate-
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based projects. Other stumbling blocks faced by cities involve constraints
imposed by fiscal stress @ice, 2011). This has become increasingly
problematic over the past decade as multiple financial crises have cast
npples of unemployment and market collapse across the entire global
communiry. Cash strapped cities struggling to keep afloat are often unable
to participate in meaningful climate planning (Allman et a1., 2004), areahty
difficult to escape given the monumental costs involved in reconfiguring
petroleum-based transportation and industrial infrastructures into carbon-
friendly ones. Consequentll,, fiscally delimited metro-regions must wait
on rhe sidelines until a positive swing in the economy boosts their capital
fesoufces.
Dierwechter and \Wessells (2013) posit another hurdle faced by
cities is the conflicting attitudes lurking between urban cores and their
suburban neighbors. In this case, disparate environmental priorities
between the two often create an asymmetrical political framework where
suburban apathy undermines the climate agendas of metropolitan
leaders. This is due largely to suburbia's continued indulgence in post-
Fordist development stfategies that emphasize outfri,l^rd expansion, strip
zoning, and automobile-driven transportation schemes. It is also due
to disconcerting fiscal inequities embedded within metropolitan regions
where "wealthy communities pick and choose the climate initiatives
that best suit their economic pufposes, and less wealthy [ones] struggle
to articulate and implement . . . 'green'rationales for new forms of
growth and municipal function" (Ibid., p. 1382). These discontinuities in
prtorittzation and political will present novel obstacles for effective climate
change management, and will require inter-municipal efforts capable of
bridging the divide berween forward thinking urban leaders and free-
riding municipalities. Failure to do so means urban initiatives dedicated to
climate planning and emissions management will be grossly handicapped
by those communities unwilling to a) coordinate effective climate agendas
with their neighbors, andf or b) curb their appetites for unfettered
material consumption, expanded spatial growth, and automobile-intensive
transpoftation networks.
Inter-municipal political differences aside, there is also the question of
whether all metro-regions are equally competent in effectively managng
climate initiatives. This is currendy an unresolved question due to the
relative newness of cities as leaders in formulating sound climate action,
as well as the diversity of city tlpes - fishing, agfafran, high-tech, etc. -
posing different urban management challenges @ierwechter, 201,3). Also,
while several city nerworks are committed to reducing GHG emissions,
there is the rcahq that cities are unparalleled sinks for natural resources,
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parasittzing outlying regions both locally and abroad for the material goods
needed for survival. In terms of the traflsportation sector alone, Toly
(201,1) points out:
Industrial and post-industrial urban metabolisms require significant
amounts of energy delivered in the form of electriciry . . . heat, and
fuel for transportation. Sustaining contemporary urban agglomerations
requires not only the depletion of flon-renewable energy sources, but
also the appropriation of such sources from distant and vulnerable
landscapes and communities (p. 143).
Another distinction of cities is they are responsible for generating most of
the world's GHG emissions - a tendency that is likely going to intensify in
the coming decades given the rising trends in urbanizeLtrort and population
concentration occurring woddwide (Corfee-Morlot et al.,2009). This
suggests cities will need to better m^nage their own urban infrastructures
if they are to j.r-p scale and become wodd leaders dedicated to
sustainability and sound ecological stewardship.
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Globalization and climate change have brought with them winds
of change that 
^re 
threatening the grip of a centuries old, state-centric
system of global governance. Should this trend continue, the wodd's
community of nations may well be in a post-Westphalian transition where
sub-national actors such as cities become dynamic forces that forever alter
the landscape of global politics and power. Evidence of this is already
abundant, considering ciry-regions are filling the leadership void formed by
nations unwilling or unable to adopt innovative climate goals. Yet despite
their promise to become frontrunners in conceptualtztng and initiating
effective environmental planning, cities will need to ansu/er many questions
related to their own political economies and systems managemeflt.
Changes will certainly need to occur as it relates to their contribution to
emissions pollution, as well as to the asymmetrical alignment of municipal
priorities that preclude cities from drafting uniform climate goals. Perhaps
most importantly, metro-regions will need to abate a troubling propensity
for draining local and foreign regions of their naturahesources, and
embrace a more holistic urban metabolism that better manages maternl
and energy flows.
On a macro scale, the global community will need to come to terms
with the new roles cities are playrne in green international relations. It will
also mean concreazing the capabilities and appropriate roles for cities vis-
i"-vis global environmental governance. For example, are cities located in
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diverse corners of the world capable of mediating and resolving planetary-
scale ecological crises affecting all peoples? SThat should the relationship
of city efforts be in respect to those at the state level, and what is the most
effective politics of scale for addressing climate change? Finally, can cities
and states co-exist and forge collaborative resolutions, or zre their goals
incompatibte? These questions are indicative of the uncertain crossroads
the international community stands upon as it tries to make sense of
globahzation's fiew wodd order. Yet one thing seems certain: u/e afe
witnessing the birth of a new type of green internationalism where cities
as agents of environmental planning are beco-irg every bit as important
as the nations they reside in.
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